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ESTATE TAXATION OF RECIPROCAL TRUSTS
NoRviE L. LAYO
I. INTRODUCTION
Since the basic purpose of the Federal estate tax legislation is the
imposition of a tax upon the transfer of property interests taking effect at
the time of a decedent's death, it is only natural that various Code sections
are directed toward accomplishing this goal notwithstanding a purported
lifetime disposition.' Hence, any inter vivos transfer that is not unequivocal
and absolute may fail to remove the property from the decedent's gross
estate for Federal estate tax purposes.
It is not essential, to inclusion in the decedent's gross estate, that the
donor or transferor have a right to return the property to himself or that
he have the ability to receive any financial benefit from the property. It is
sufficient if he can designate the persons who can enjoy the property or
the income therefrom as a result of a retained power to this effect.2 Like-
wise, if the decedent, at the time of his death, has the right to change the
enjoyment of such property because of the possession of a power to alter,
amend, revoke, or terminate the property interest transferred, the value of
such interest would be included in the decedent's gross estate.3 It is imma-
terial whether these rights are ever exercised by the decedent. Their reten-
tion4 or possession5 is the crucial factor.
The rationale of such inclusion is obvious. As long as the transferor
retains these powers over the property, he has not divested himself of all
the incidents of ownership nor has he transferred all economic benefits to
one other than himself. The final and complete transfer occurs only at the
time when he can no longer exercise any control over the property through
the utilization of the retained or possessed powers, i.e., the date of death.
The transfer, having taken place at the time of death, the decedents gross
estate will include the value of such property to the extent of his interest
therein for it is in essence a testamentary disposition.
OAssociate Professor of Law, University of Louisville.
I. In particular see INT. R.v. CODE of 1954, § 2035 relating to transfers in
contemplation of death; INT. REv. CODE of 1954, § 2036 regarding transfers with re-
tained life estate; INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 2037 involving transfers taking effect
on death, and; INT. Rzv. CODE of 1954, § 2038 dealing with revocable transfers. Un-
less otherwise designated, all sections are from the Internal Revenue Code of 1954,
as amended.
2. INT. REv. CODE of 1954, § 2056.
3. INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 2057.
4. A § 2036 power must have been retained by the transferor at the time of
the transfer in order for the section to apply.
5. A § 2038 power need not be onginally retained by the transferor. It need
only be possessed at the time of the decedent's death.
(166)
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As is to be expected, many individuals desire to avoid the inclusion
of all their property in their gross estates for Federal estate tax purposes.
Counterbalancing this desire is the wish to continue to enjoy all or some of
the benefits therefrom during their lifetimes. This has often led to a trans-
fer in trust with the grantor retaining some rights in the property but
divesting himself of enough interest so as to create a reasonable expecta-
tion of having the value of the property excluded from his gross estate.
These often elaborate schemes have proved both successful and unsuccessful
depending upon the particular factual situations involved. The purpose
of this article is to explore one such type of transfer in view of the Supreme
Court's recent decision in United States v. Grace.6 In order to do so, some
preliminary consideration should be given to sections 2036 and 2038 of
the Internal Revenue Code in conjunction with previous decisions.
II. SEmTONS 2036 AND 2038
Section 2036 is designed to include in the decedent's gross estate the
value of all property which he has transferred for less than an adequate and
full consideration, and property in which he has retained possession, en-
joyment or the right to receive income. It also includes those transfers
where the decedent retains "the right, either alone or in conjunction with
any person, to designate the persons who shall possess or enjoy the property
or the income therefrom."7 It is not necessary to the application of section
2036 that the decedent reserve all of these powers in the transferred prop-
erty. It is sufficient that he retain any of the enumerated interests or powers
"for his life, for any period not ascertainable without reference to his death,
or for any period which does not in fact end before his death .... ."8
Whereas section 2036 requires that these powers be retained by the
transferor, section 2038 has reference to certain rights that are possessed by
the decedent at the time of his death irrespective of when he acquired them.
Accordingly, the decedent's gross estate would include the value of all prop-
erty, to the extent of any interest therein, of which he has made a transfer
for less than an adequate and full consideration
where the enjoyment thereof was subject at the date of his death
to any change through the exercise of a power (in whatever ca-
pacity exercisable) by the decedent alone or by the decedent in
conjunction with any other person (without regard to when or
from what source the decedent acquired such power), to alter,
amend, revoke, or terminate .... 0
Again, the decedent need not have the power to return the property to
himself by a revocation or termination of the transfer. The mere power
6. 395 U.S. 316 (1969).
7. INT. REv. CODE of 1954, § 2036 (a) (2).
8. INT. REv. CODE of 1954, § 2036 (a).
9. INT. REv. CODE of 1954, § 2038 (a) (1).
1970]
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to alter or amend raises the possibility of a section 2038 inclusion. In this
respect it is analogous to section 2036 where the power to control the eco-
nomic benefits of the transferred property is the important factor and not
the ability to return the property or income to the decedent.
These two sections must be hurdled by the individual desiring to
avoid the inclusion of some of his property in his gross estate while retain-
ing the use thereof during his lifetime. In many factual settings, both sec-
tions will apply to the same transfer although there are instances where
only one will be applicablelo
III. THE PROBLEM Or THE TRANSFEROR
For section 2036 to be applicable to a retained interest, and for sec-
tion 2038 to include a possessed power, the powers or interests must relate to
a transfer of property made by the decedent. Hence, if the decedent was
not the transferor, neither section would apply. This should not be inter-
preted to mean that the decedent's gross estate would not include the value
of any part of the property to which the power relates,11 but only that it
would not be included under either of these two sections.
Lest it be assumed that the decedent can easily avoid being deemed the
transferor by giving the property to a third person who in turn would make
the transfer thereby giving the decedent some interest therein free of estate
tax liability, it should be pointed out that the courts have consistently
looked to the substance and not to the form of the transaction. The use
of a strawman would not interfere with the courts' determination of the
true transferor. For example, if the owner of the property transfers it to a
donee with the specific instruction to create a trust or conditions the trans-
fer on the creation of a trust, the donor will be treated as the settlor for
purposes of sections 2036 and 2038.12 If the rights or interests of the donor
are covered by either section, the value of the property transferred, to the
extent of any interest therein, would be included in the donor's gross estate
although he was not the person who formally created the trust nor trans-
ferred legal title to the trustee. The same rule would apply if the donor
gave property to the donee upon the understanding that a trust would be
created by the donee. 13 The donor would again be considered as the trans-
feror for estate tax purposes.
10. For some of the comparisons and distinctions between §§ 2036 and 2038,
see Industrial Trust Co. v. Comm'r, 165 F.2d 142 (1st Gir. 1947) and Treas. Reg.
§§ 20.2036-1 (b) (2) (iii), 20.2038-1 (b). See also C. LOWNDES & R. KRAmia, FEDERAL
ESTATE AND GIFT TAxES § 9.14 (2d ed. 1962).
11. For example, the rights granted in the property might be deemed a gen-
eral power of appointment and included under § 2041. Other pertinent sections
would have to be considered in each case in order to be assured of non-inclusion.
12. State Street Trust Co. v. United States, 263 F.2d 635 (1st Cir. 1959).
13. Estate of Grace D. Sinclair, 13 T.C. 742 (1949); Estate of George W. Hall,
6 T.C. 933 (1946).
[Vol. 35
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On the other hand, if there has been a complete and irrevocable gift
without any agreement or understanding between the parties as to what
the donee can do with the property after the gift, the donor would not
be considered as the transferor or settlor if the donee should subsequently
create a trust and give the donor some interest therein.14
Whether the donor or donee is the actual transferor is a question of
fact to be determined on a case by case basis. In determining this issue,
the courts will go beyond the trust instrument in order to ascertain "whether
the significant shifting of economic ihterests and the change of dominion
and control over property has been different from what the trust instru-
ment indicates." 15 Where "such analysis shows that another than the
formal settlor is in reality the transferor, his estate may be taxed accord-
ingly."16
IV. RacpaRocAL TRusTs
The question of the settlor of a trust is not only important where there
has been a gift preceding the creation of the trust, but also arises where
there are dual or reciprocal trusts. One of the leading cases involving this
problem was Lehman v. Commissioner,17 where the decedent and his
brother each created a trust. The decedent agreed to create a trust for his
brother and his issue in consideration of his brother creating a trust for
the decedent and his issue. The two brothers executed trust agreements
simultaneously wherein the trustee was to pay the income to the other
brother for life, remainder to his issue. The life tenant was given the right
to withdraw $150,000 from the principal.
Upon the decedent's death, the court held that $150,000 was properly
includible in his gross estate since, at the date of his death, he possessed
the ability to change the enjoyment of the transferred property by exer-
cising his power to receive the $150,000.18 There was no dispute that this
amount would have been included in the decedent's gross estate if this
right had been reserved by him in the property which he transferred. How-
ever, the power was given to the decedent by his brother and related to the
property placed in trust by the brother. The real issue, therefore, centered
around the determination of the actual transferor. The court concluded
that there was absolutely no reason why the decedent should not be con-
sidered as the settlor of this trust. The decisive point was that the decedent,
by transferring his property for his brother's use, caused the brother to create
14. Plimpton v. Comm'r, 135 F.2d 482 (1st Cir. 1943).
15. Newberry's Estate v. Comm'r, 201 F.2d 874, 876 (3d Cir. 1953).
16. Id.
17. 109 F.2d 99 (2d Cir. 1940), cert. denied, 310 U.S. 637 (1940).
18. This was included under § 302 (d) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1926
and is very similar to the language now employed in INT. REV. CoDE of 1954, § 2038.
The entire value of the transferred property would now be included under § 2036
as a result of the retained life interest but such was not the case at the time of the
decedents death in Lehman.
1970]
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the trust in favor of the decedent. In so holding, the court stated that while
the Internal Revenue Code
speaks of a decedent having made a transfer of property with en-
joyment subject to change by exercise of power to alter, amend or
revoke in the decedent, it clearly covers a case where the decedent,
by paying a quid pro quo, has caused another to make a transfer
of property with enjoyment subject to change by exercise of such
power by the decedent. [Hence,] the transfer by the decedent's
brother having been paid for and brought about by the decedent,
was in substance a 'transfer' by the decedent, and the property so
transferred formed part of his taxable estate... to the extent that
the decedent had power 'to alter, amend or revoke' the enjoyment
of it, that is to say, to the extent of $150,000.19
The court ignored the formalities involved in the creation of the two
trusts and looked to the substance thereof. In so doing, each brother was
treated as the settlor of the trust created by the other. Reciprocal trusts
involving consideration between the settlors were thereby denied effective-
ness as a method of retaining some control over or interest in property while
avoiding its inclusion in the decedent's gross estate.
A. The Issue of Consideration
Since the Lehman decision was premised upon the presence of con-
sideration, the courts were immediately presented with the necessity of
determining whether, under the factual situation of each case, there was
consideration. (As expected, the parties after Lehman were not always as
patent in setting forth their subjective intentions nor in detailing the nature
of the consideration for the reciprocal trusts if it in fact existed.)
The proximity in time of the creation of each trust is naturally im-
portant to this determination. Consideration has been found to exist
where a husband and wife simultaneously created trusts and granted iden-
tical benefits therein to each other 20 although the amounts contained in
each trust were not necessarily the same.21 To the extent that the amounts
were identical, there would be little difficulty in finding consideration.2
2
Such a decision was reached by the Tax Court where the spouses created
reciprocal trusts within six days of each other and there was evidence that
the spouses habitually consulted each other in connection with their busi-
ness and personal matters and were unusually intimate in their financial
and business affairs.23 These factors led the court to hold that the trusts
19. Lehman v. Comm'r, 109 F.2d 99, 100 (2d Cir. 1940), cert. denied, 310 U.S.
637 (1940).
20. Hanauer's Estate v. Comm'r, 149 F.2d 857 (2d Cir. 1945), cert. denied, 326
U.S. 770 (1945).
21. Cole's Estate v. Comm'r, 140 F.2d 636 (8th Cir. 1944).
22. Id.
23. Estate of John H. Eckhardt, 5 T.C. 673 (1945).
[Vol. 35
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were made in consideration of each other, thus establishing tnat simultane-
ous transfers are not imperative to a finding of consideration. 24 However,
if the trusts are created some months apart, the fact that they contain sim-
ilar or identical provisions for the other settlor may not be enough to estab-
lish that they were created in consideration for each other.25
Other factors to be considered in determining whether there is con-
sideration are: whether the rights granted to the other are the same or
similar; whether the amounts involved in each trust are identical; and
whether the instruments were prepared by the same person.2 6 However,
notwithstanding the presence of all these factors, in the absence of con-
certed action, consideration need not be presumed from the creation of two
trusts. The mere
fact that the trusts were created at the same time and contained
reciprocal provisions does not prove that one was created in con-
sideration of the other, and the fact that the transfers were in
equal amounts and made at the same time does not show that one
was made in consideration of the other.27
In short, the question of consideration, therefore, is one of fact often turn-
ing on a determination as to the parties' intent in such particular situation.
This determination is well illustrated in Newberry's Estate v. Commis-
sioner.28 In that case the husband created two irrevocable trusts wherein
he named himself and his wife as trustees. He gave his wife broad powers
to alter, amend, or terminate the trusts, but under no circumstances could
any part of the income or principal be revested in him. At the time each
trust was created, the wife executed a similar trust giving the husband the
same powers of alteration that she was given in the instruments executed by
him. On each occasion when the husband amended the trusts by limiting
the wife's power, the wife made identical or equivalent changes in the trusts
which she had created.
At the wife's death, the Commissioner sought to include in her gross
estate the value of the property interest transferred in trust by the husband
since the enjoyment of that interest was subject to change through the
exercise by her of a power to alter or revoke.29 It was admitted that the
decedent had the requisite power of alteration, but it was argued that she
had this power as a result of the husband's transfer and not as a result of
24. Id. See Estate of Laura Carter, 31 T.C. 1148 (1959); Werner v. Weiboldt,
5 T.C. 946 (1945); and Purdon Smith Whiteley, 42 B.T.A. 316 (1940). The last two
cases involve income tax, but the principles involved with regard to reciprocal
trusts are the same as those relating to estate tax.
25. In re Lueders' Estate, 164 F.2d 128 (3d Cir. 1947).
26. Moreno v. Comm'r, 260 F.2d 389 (8th Cir. 1958).
27. Marrs McClean, 41 B.T.A. 1266, 1267 (1940). Although this case involved
the application of the gift tax, the principles espoused would apply to the estate
tax.
28. 201 F.2d 874 (3d Cir. 1953.
29. This power would presently be covered by § 2038.
1970]
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consideration she gave by transferring property to him. Again the issue was
whether she should be considered as the real transferor of this property
placed in trust by her husband since she had created identical trusts at
the time her husband gave her this power.
It was established that the spouses usually talked over important finan-
cial matters. Furthermore, the wife had taken part in the discussions lead-
ing to the creation of the trusts and became interested in the plan as soon
as the husband suggested the trust idea to her. She never gave any indica-
tion that she would not create her trusts if the husband did so. On the
contrary, the facts led to the impression that she thought the husband's
plan was a good one and that she wanted to create the same type of trusts.
However, the husband gave uncontroverted testimony to the effect that he
would have executed these trusts irrespective of whether his wife had de-
cided upon a similar course of action.
Recognizing that one other than the formal transferor could be treated
as the transferor for tax purposes, the court held that in order to do so,
it must be shown that the declared grantor must have been "induced to
establish a trust giving the party now to be treated for tax purposes as the
grantor, a power which the latter wanted and has paid for by setting up
another trust to accomplish something desired by the declared grantor."3 0
In other words, there must be consideration for the reciprocal trusts. The
court felt that this was the requirement of the Lehman decision and con-
cluded that facts did not warrant such an interpretation here. Since spouses
often work together in planning for the disposition of their estates in such
a manner as to adequately provide for their children, in the usual case "it
is a distortion of meaning to say that the action of one spouse is a quid
pro quo inducing the action of the other."31 The only "consideration"
present would be that of love and affection which was insufficient to invoke
the sanction of Lehman.
The court conceded that it was possible that a true bargain and ex-
change might be unprovable although actually existing since "domestic
privacy and informality may effectively conceal understandings made and
honored between husband and wife at variance with the formal and ap-
parent aspects of family financial transactions."3 2 Nevertheless,
when on the facts the conclusion is inescapable that each spouse
by a distinct and bona fide transaction has dispensed of his own
separate estate in accordance with his own personal desires and
without receiving a quid pro quo from the other, we think a court
cannot justifiably refuse to recognize each spouse as the real trans-
feror of the trust he has formally created.s3
30. Newberry's Estate v. Coam'r, 201 F.2d 874, 877 (3d Cir. 1952).
31. Id.
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This is true even though the parties may have chosen the route which
entails the least amount of taxation. "[T]ax saving motivation does not
justify the taxing authorities or the courts in nullifying, or disregarding,
the taxpayer's otherwise proper and bona fide choice among courses of
action." 34
It is clear that the court in Lehman was in a much better position to
find consideration since there each party had agreed to create a trust in
return for a like promise by the other party. However, in Newberry it was
not shown that the creation of either set of trusts was actually dependent
on the other set. Even so, it is not at all unlikely that other courts would
have been willing to infer such consideration from the reciprocal provi-
sions themselves coupled with the simultaneous creation of the trusts by
marital partners.3 5 In any event, Newberry caused additional confusion in
the already troublesome area of consideration.
This problem of consideration was made more manifest in McLain
v. Jarecki36 where a husband and wife each executed a trust containing
similar provisions beneficial to the other on the same day. The court was
unable to find any specific facts establishing consideration and was un-
willing to infer any. To do so "would mean compounding probabilities on
the subjective impression we have of the objective stipulated facts."3 7'
Conversely, the dissenters felt that the majority had overlooked the
significance of the fact that a beneficial interest was contemporaneously
bestowed upon the maker of each trust by the settlor of the other and felt
that it would be unreasonable to assume that the transaction lacked con-
sideration. Again, it was obvious that each case turned upon its own pe-
culiar facts.
B. Estate of Grace
The troublesome problem of consideration continued until the Supreme
Court's recent decision in United States v. Estate of Grace.38 In what is
now a familiar pattern, the husband and wife simultaneously created sim-
ilar trusts granting certain powers and interests to the other marital partner.
The nature of these interests were such that the beneficiary (the spouse of
the settlor) would receive the income for life and had the power to desig-
nate, either by an inter vivos or testamentary instrument, the manner in
which the corpus would be distributed among the settlor and their chil-
dren. If each settlor had retained these powers in the property which he
placed in trust, it would have been included in his gross estate for Federal
34. Id.
35. See for example Orvis v. Higgins, 180 F.2d 537 (2d Cir. 1950); and Cole's
Estate v. Comm'r, 140 F.2d 636 (8th Cir. 1944).
36. 232 F.2d 211 (7th Cir. 1956).
37. Id. at 213.
38. 395 U.S. 316 (1969).
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estate tax purposes.39 Upon the husband's death, the Commissioner claimed
that the trusts were "reciprocal" and asserted that the husband's gross estate
should include the value of the property placed in trust by the wife. The
Court of Claims disagreed on the basis that there was no consideration
passing between the spouses and that neither trust was established as a quid
pro quo for the other.4 0
The Supreme Court granted certiorari 41 and reversed. 42 In so doing
the Court made several important observations with regard to the reciprocal
trust situation. First, any attempt to ascertain the subjective intent of
anyone, particularly spouses, is a very difficult chore. This is particularly
true in a case such as Grace where both parties are deceased and some thirty
years has passed since the creation of the trusts. If too great an emphasis
is placed on attempting to ascertain subjective intent, substantial obstacles
to the proper application of the estate tax laws could easily be created.
Second, even where there is no real evidence of the settlor's subjective
intent it is highly probable that any such reciprocal trust arrangement was
created with the predominant thought of saving or avoiding taxes. If this
were not true, why go through the elaborate procedure of having each
spouse give the powers and interests to the marital partner. Why not simply
retain them in the property being placed in trust?
Third, even if there was no actual tax-avoidance incentive, the settlor
did in fact retain a real economic interest while purporting to give away
his entire interest in the property which he placed in trust. He retained this
economic interest by knowing in advance that he could safely give away
all the incidents of ownership in his own property while being assured
that the interests which he would like to retain would be given him in the
property which his spouse was to place in trust. If this is true, he has not
really made a complete and final gift of all his rights in the property which
he placed in trust.
Last, the court felt that it was unrealistic to assume that the settlors
would have created the trusts without consideration had there not existed
a familiar relationship between them. Consideration, in the traditional
sense, would not normally enter into interfamily transactions and there-
fore, the Court held that the application of the reciprocal trust doctrine
was not dependent upon any finding of consideration nor was it neces-
sary to establish that the parties had a tax-avoidance motive. The Court
concluded, "application of the reciprocal trust doctrine requires only that
the trusts be interrelated, and that the arrangement, to the extent of mutual
value, leaves the settlors in approximately the same economic positions as
they would have been in had they created trusts naming themselves as life
59. This would be included under what is now section 2036.
40. Estate of Grace v. United States, 393 F.2d 939 (Ct. Cl. 1968), rev'd, 395
U.S. 816 (1969).
41. 393 U.S. 975 (1968).
42. 895 U.S. 816 (1969).
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beneficiaries." 43 Applying this test to the facts in Grace, the Court con-
cluded that the value of the property placed in trust by the wife should be
included in the husband's gross estate since the effective position of each
party vis-a-vis the property did not change at all. The parties were in the
same objective economic position after the transfers as they were preceding
them.
This test of reciprocity should be more easily administered than an
inquiry into the presence of consideration. The courts may now make an
objective determination as to what the economic positions of the respective
parties are after the creation of the trusts. This is not to suggest that sub-
jective factors will not play a role in future reciprocal trust decisions but
only that the courts will not be totally dependent upon them. Not only
is the Grace test more easily applied, but it would appear to require a
result more closely approximating that intended by the Code. If a party
possesses an economic interest in property transferred by another comparable
to that which he would have retained in property he transferred in trust,
the net economic effect is the same, any difference in subjective intent not-
withstanding. In either event, property interests have been "retained" and
the value of the property should be included in the decedent's gross estate.
V. CONCLUSION
Estate of Grace44 represents a significant clarification of the prior
confused situation in the area of reciprocal trusts by laying the consideration
issue to rest. However, while Grace rejected the doctrine of consideration
as a true test of reciprocity in the trust area, it did not completely nullify
its possible relevance in all factual situations. Consideration may still be
important in establishing the link between the two trusts even though it is
no longer essential to prove reciprocity. If there is in fact bargained-for
consideration, the result would be the same as in Estate of Grace but it
should be remembered property may be included in the deceased's gross
estate without actually finding consideration.
43. Id. at 324.
44. Of significance is the fact the Court, in granting certiorari, stated that it
did so "because of an alleged conflict between the decisions below and certain de-
cisions in the courts of appeals and because of the importance of the issue presented
to the administration of the federal estate tax laws." Id. at 318. Grace may represent
a new Supreme Court policy of granting certiorari in tax cases with a greater degree
of frequency in an attempt to resolve conflicts among the circuits. The result would
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